The correctness in decrypting a ciphertext after some operations in the DGVH scheme depends heavily on the dimension of the secret key. In this paper we compute two bounds on the size of the secret key for the DGHV scheme to decrypt correctly a ciphertext after a fixed number of additions and a fixed number of multiplication. Moreover we improve the original bound on the dimension of the secret key for a general circuit.
Introduction
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) allows to perform computation of arbitrary functions on encrypted data without being able to decrypt. The first construction of an FHE scheme was described by Gentry in his Ph.D. thesis [7] in 2009. The first Gentry's FHE scheme [7, 8] proceeds in three steps. First, one constructs a somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) scheme, namely which is able to decrypt correctly only a limited number of operations. The second step is to express the encryption function by a low-degree polynomial (squash). Then, one applies the bootstrapping to reduce the noise and to compact the ciphertext.
Nowadays three main families of FHE schemes are:
1. Gentry's scheme [7, 8] , based on hard problems on ideal lattices, and implemented in [9, 13] . 2. van Dijk, Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan's (DGHV) scheme over the integers [6] , based on the approximate GCD problem, and implemented in [5] . A batch version of this scheme has been proposed in [4] . 3. Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan's (BV) scheme based on the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem [2] or Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) problem [3] . Other implementations are in [1, 10, 11] . For a survey articles see [12, 14] .
In this paper we focus on the SHE of the DGHV scheme [6] , whose description we recall in Sect. 2. As already said, in SHE schemes if the size of noise remains below a certain threshold, then one can decrypt correctly the ciphertext. This threshold is dependent on the dimension of the secret key. In Sect. 3, first we compute two bounds on the size of the secret key which permit, respectively, to decrypt correctly a ciphertext after performing a certain number of homomorphic either additions or multiplications (Lemma 2). Then, in Lemma 3 we improve slightly the bound on the secret key for a general circuit, claimed in Lemma 3 in [6] . Finally, in Sect. 3.3 we show explicitly that in Evaluate algorithm we cannot reduce the ciphertext modulo the public key element x 0 as observed in [6] .
Preliminary

Homomorphic encryption
Let λ be the security parameter. An homomorphic public key encryption scheme E = (KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Evaluate) is a quadruple of probabilistic polynomialtime (PPT) algorithms as follows.
-KeyGen(λ) = (sk, pk), it takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a pair of keys (sk, pk), where sk is called the secret key and pk is called the public key.
it takes as inputs pk and a message m, that is a bit, and outputs a ciphertext c. Another requirement of FHE, called ciphertext compactness, is that the size of ciphertexts is bounded and independent of the circuit C.To define formally FHE, we need the following definitions given in [6] .
Definition 1
The scheme E is correct for a given t-input circuit C if, for any keypair (sk, pk) output by KeyGen(λ), any t plaintexts m 1 , . . . , m t ∈ F 2 , and any t ciphertexts c i = Encrypt(pk, m i ) for i = 1, . . . , t, it is the case that:
Definition 2
The scheme E is homomorphic for a class C of circuits if it is correct for all circuits C ∈ C, whereas E is fully homomorphic if it is correct for all boolean circuits.
In this paper, we deal with SHE. Informally, we say that E is a SHE scheme if it has only some homomorphic properties but it is not fully since -it can perform a limited number of operations, -the ciphertexts compactness requirement might be violated.
In the next subsection we see in details the DGHV scheme defined in [6] .
The somewhat homomorphic DGHV scheme
Throughout the paper we denote a random choice of an element x in a set X by x $ ← − − X . Let λ be the security parameter. The DGHV public-key scheme is the homomorphic encryption scheme E = (KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Evaluate), which uses the five parameters (all depending from λ): η: the bit-length of the secret key sk, γ : the bit-length of the integers in the public key pk, ρ: the bit-length of the noise in KeyGen, ρ : the bit-length of the noise in Encrypt, τ : the number of integers in the public key.
In [6] the authors proved that these parameters must be set as follows:
-ρ = ω(log λ), to protect against brute-force attacks on the noise; -η ≥ ρ ·Θ(λ log 2 λ) to support homomorphism for deep enough circuits to evaluate the "squashed decryption circuit" (see Sections 3.2 and 6.2 in [6] ); -γ = ω(η 2 log λ) to thwart various lattice-based attacks on the underlying approximate-gcd problem (see Section 5 in [6] ); -τ ≥ γ + ω(log λ) (see Lemma 4.3 in [6] ); -ρ = ρ + ω(log λ), used as secondary noise parameter.
Hence, In [6] the authors claimed that a convenient set of parameters is ρ = λ,
For a specific odd η-bit positive integer p, we use the following distribution over γ -bit integers:
The algorithms of E are defined as follows:
The secret key sk is a random odd η-bit positive integer
The public key needs to be generated as follows
if x 0 is odd and r 0 is even, then the public key is the set of numbers chosen in (a):
Otherwise restart from (a).
Encrypt(pk, m) = c. It chooses:
and computes a ciphertext
The output m * is computes in this way:
Evaluate(pk, C, c 1 , . . . , c t ) = c f . Given the (binary) circuit C with t inputs, and t ciphertexts c i , we apply the (integer) addition and multiplication gates of C to the ciphertexts, performing all the operations over the integers, and return the resulting integer. Finally the output of Evaluate is a ciphertext c f , which is an integer.
Bound on the decryption
For every x ∈ R, let x = max{k ∈ Z : k ≤ x} be the floor of x and let x = min{k ∈ Z : k ≥ x} be the ceiling of x. We denote the nearest integer of x by x , in other words
Throughout the section for every y and m ∈ Z we consider the reduction of y modulo m in (− Proof By definition c = (m + 2r + 2 i∈S x i ) mod x 0 is a fresh ciphertext. In particular we have that:
When we decrypt the fresh ciphertext c, we compute:
Since r 0 is even, if m + 2r + 2 i∈S r i − kr 0 is in [− So we want that
Now m + 2r + 2 i∈S x i ≡ c mod x 0 , i.e. m + 2r + 2 i∈S x i = c + kx 0 . Since we consider the reduction modulo
Since m + 2r x 0 , then we can consider
In the worst case of (2), we have that i∈S x i = τ x 0 , so we obtain
Whereas, in the worst case of (1), replacing k with 2τ , we have
Considering the number of bits of p, r i and r , since r 0 ∈ (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ), for the worst case we obtain
that is, 2 η > 4(2 ρ + τ 2 ρ+1 ). Then we obtain the bound
Bound on the decryption of ciphertexts after operations
In this section we present two different bounds on the bit-length of sk such that DGHVscheme is homomorphic with respect to either a circuit with only v addictions or a circuit with only s multiplications. 
Lemma 2 Let
Proof We consider two distinct cases: the sum of v ciphertexts and the product of s ciphertexts. For both we examine the worst case, that is, the sum (or the product) of ciphertext having the same error.
1. We suppose that Evaluate takes as input v times the same ciphertext c. So, we have
where k is such as in (2). As in the proof of Lemma 1, we want that
So we obtain 2 η > 4v
Note that the inequality below is η > B + log 2 v, where B is the value on the right side of bound (3). 
where k is such as in (2) . As before, we want that
Note that the inequality below is η > s · (B − 1) + 1, where B is the value on the right side of bound (3).
In general we have the following lemma: 
By 2. of Lemma 2, we obtain:
Note that for large λ, we have log 2 (2 ρ + τ 2 ρ+1 ) ≈ log 2 (2 ρ ) and so we obtain
If we consider | f (c)| < p/8, we obtain η ≥ d(ρ +1)+4+log |f|, slightly improving of Lemma 3 in [6] which claims η ≥ d(ρ + 2) + 4 + log |f|. In particular, if d is large then the improvement is significant.
Encrypt vs Evaluate
As we saw before, a key property of FHE is the compactness of the ciphertext [6] [7] [8] 14] . We recall that a ciphertext c f is compact if its size, after homomorphic evaluation, does not depend on the number of inputs t and it is also independent of the circuit C. This means that we want that the ciphertext c f has the same size of the output c of Encrypt. Note that it does not happen in DGHV scheme because in the Encrypt algorithm the ciphertext is reduced modulo x 0 , whereas in the Evaluate algorithm this reduction is not performed and so the ciphertext grows. After just one multiplication the ciphertext becomes much larger than x 0 and this implies that η > γ . We recall that γ has to be equal to ω(η 2 log λ), and so bigger than η. Although the reduction modulo x 0 would help in the Evaluate algorithm, in [6] the authors claim that this reduction is not possible. Since their claim is not obvious to us, we provide an explicit formal proof. We consider c f equals to c 2 modulo x 0 : 
So we have
that is, in the worst case,
Hence, since we can consider 
Considering the number of bits of p, r i and r , since (7) holds f or every r 0 ∈ (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ), in the worst case we can observe that 
